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SYMPOSIUM ON THE FUTURE
OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE WORLD LEGAL ORDER
INTRODUCTION: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND JURISPRUDENCE
Myres S. McDougal*

Lung-chu Chen**
Like the men of fable who observed the elephant differently
from different vantage points, scholars who write about human
rights commonly, and sometimes most inaccurately, observe mere
fragments of a total context. Some critics of recent developments in
the international law of human rights can, thus, see only an
Hobbesian-global community process in which reified, isolated
nation-states are the principal, if not the sole, actors and inter-

actors.'

The enormous and accelerating increase, since West-

phalia in 1648, in the intensity of interaction of individual human

beings, through multiple and diverse associations, private as well
as governmental, with a near total compression of time and space
* Sterling Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School; Distinguished Visiting
Professor of Law, New York Law School.
** Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. The impetus for this Symposium on the Future of Human Rights in the
World Legal Order was, in part, articles written by Professors James S. Watson and
Eric Lane. See Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 269 (1978); Lane, Mass Killing by Governments: Lawful in
the World Legal Order?, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 238 (1979); Watson, Autointerpretation, Competence and the Continuing Validity of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter,71
AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1977); Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in InternationalLaw, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609. In
sum, Professors Watson and Lane claim that a jurisprudential basis for vindicating
human rights does not exist under the Westphalian legal order. Ed.
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in a continuing universalization of science and technology, escapes
their attention. From their walled-state perspectives, they are able
to perceive neither the rising, common demands of peoples about
the globe for a greater production and wider sharing of all values
nor the inescapable interdetermination and interdependence of all
peoples in securing demanded values. Hence, noting only a fantasied tail of an imaginary elephant, these critics are able to come to
the astonishing conclusions that how one state treats its citizens has
no important impact upon the citizens of other states and that
there is no shared, common interest among the peoples of the
world in promoting and securing human rights.
The perception of the global process of effective power, an integral component of the larger community process, achieved by the
critics of the human rights developments, partakes of no greater realism. The principal bearer of effective power in transnational interaction is, once again, observed to be the nation-state, and the
structures of interaction of states are described as "horizontal," in a
vast diminution of the increasingly important roles of international
governmental organizations, political parties, pressure groups, and
private associations of all kinds. Neither the rising demands of peoples for a greater production and wider sharing of values, nor the
constraints of interdependence, nor the expectations of peoples
about authority and control which, in fact, transcend state lines are
regarded as relevant bases of effective power. The sole possible
source of sanction for violation of human rights prescriptions, as for
other prescriptions, is imagined to reside in the coercive application of the military instrument by one state to another state.
The conception of international law that inspires critics of the
human rights developments is that of a preexisting body of rules
whose exclusive function is regulating the interrelations of nationstates. A simplistic distinction is made between "international law"
and "supranational law" which is alleged to be necessitated by
some mysterious dichotomy between a "community of states" (the
Westphalian conception) and world government. The vast continuum, between these two extremes, of the contemporary, pluralistic
transnational process of authoritative decision, remains to blush unseen. Particular preexisting rules of international law can be
changed, it is argued, only with the specific consent of states, and
the very nature of "sovereignty," "domestic jurisdiction," "independence," and so on, precludes even a consensual change of the
rules toward a greater protection of human rights. The only source
of authority transcending state lines, it is sometimes asserted, must
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be found in the law of nature, which is often obscure. It is apparently not recognized that particular rules, whatever their subject,
find empirical meaning only in their use in an ongoing, comprehensive process of authoritative decision in which they are continuously being made and remade, to serve the purposes of the living.
Other writers upon human rights have, happily, been able to
achieve a more comprehensive and realistic picture of the larger
context. 2 For some observers human rights are most appropriately
conceived, in a designative reference, in terms of the shaping and
sharing of values by individual human beings in community process. From this perspective, the whole of humankind today
constitutues a single global or earth-space community, however inadequately organized, in the sense of a complete interdetermination in relation to the shaping and sharing of all values. This most
comprehensive process operates through, and has impacts upon, all
the lesser communities, both territorial and functional, and these
lesser communities in turn both reciprocally affect each other and
shape the character and quality of the most comprehensive process. In this larger context, the individual human being, as the ultimate actor in all social interaction, identifies and affiliates with, and
makes demands upon, and in behalf of, a whole range of groups
and associations. These include not merely nation-states, but lesser
and larger territorial communities, international governmental organizations, political parties, pressure groups, tribes, families, and
private associations of all kinds; like other associations, even the
nation-state is but a patterning of the perspectives and operations
of the individual human beings who constitute it. The most obvious
outcome of this comprehensive process of interaction, it is emphasized, is the pervasive and ineradicable interdependence of individuals everywhere, both within any particular value process and as
between value processes, in the shaping and sharing of all values:
The human rights that any one individual or community can
achieve and protect is a function of the human rights that other individuals and communities can achieve and protect.
Observers of the larger global-community process are able to
note within it a process of effective power in which the rising demands of individuals for a greater production and wider sharing of
values, the constraints of the interdependences that envelop all individuals and communities, and the expectations about authority
2. The themes here developed are documented in M. McDOUGAL,
LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980).
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and control which, in fact, transcend the boundaries of particular
states all serve as important bases of power in establishing and
maintaining transnational authoritative decision. The nation-states
of the world, though still the most conspicuous wielders of effective
power, are no longer observed to be, if ever they were, impermeable and isolated entities; nuclear and other weapons may be making such entities as obsolete as the cannonball made walled cities.
International governmental organizations and other groupings are
breaking the monopoly of the nation-state as a source of authority,
and a great host of private associations is widely diffusing both control and expectations about control.
The conception of international law that inspires many observers of the human rights developments is not that of a mere body of
rules, but that of a comprehensive process of authoritative decision, in which rules are continuously made, remade, and applied,
in an effort to clarify and secure the common interests of the peoples of the world, with rejection of all claims of special interest. It
is observed that the contemporary world arena exhibits an increasingly viable constitutive process of authoritative decision which,
though it has not achieved the high stability in expectations about
authority or degree of effective control over constituent members
that characterizes the more mature national communities, offers in
increasingly democratic and effective form all the basic features of
decision process essential to the making and application of law. A
most significant feature in this global development of constitutive
process is the emergence, in response to the intensifying demands
of peoples everywhere, of an immense body of prescriptions-beginning with the United Nations Charter and extending through the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the two major international covenants and numerous more specialized and ancillary
formulations-which have taken on both the substance and form of
the basic bills of rights long established and maintained in national
communities. In substance, this new global bill of human rights, it
may be noted, embraces the whole spectrum of values contemporarily cherished by humankind, beginning with collective political
emancipation and moving to greater participation by all individuals
in the shaping and sharing of all values. The structures and procedures for applying and sanctioning these human rights prescriptions, as for other prescriptions, remain imperfect, but continuous
improvement is being made in such structures and procedures, and
the basic prescriptions cannot reasonably be expected to become
desuetudinous so long as the values they embody continue to fire
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the demands of peoples, and peoples retain a realistic understanding of the conditions under which their values can be achieved.
It is in wise insight that the Editors of the Hofstra Law Review perceive that differences in jurisprudence, in theories for inquiry about law, cause very great differences in the conception and
understanding of human rights. Elsewhere we have sought to document that one of the factors affecting the slow development of appropriate institutions and procedures for protecting human rights
has been simple intellectual confusion. 3 Scholars have neither adequately clarified the common interests of all individuals in the
greater production and wider sharing of human rights values nor
created among individuals the appropriate perceptions of such
common interests. It may be recalled that a natural law frame of
reference, though historically affording an important appeal from
naked power to higher authority, offers a conception of human
rights in terms of absolutes, buttressed by transempirical justifications both theological and metaphysical, and employs intellectual
procedures that can be made equally to support either human dignity or human indignity. Similarly, an historical frame of reference,
though it has the advantage of locating interaction in social process,
defines human rights in terms of the values in fact demanded by
the members of a community, both ignoring that the community
may be totalitarian and expressing a fatalistic minimization of the
possibilities of change by deliberate decision. A positivistic or analytical frame of reference, further, as is illustrated by contemporary
critics of human rights, defines authority exclusively in terms of the
demands of the officials of nation-states and human rights as the
rights actually protected by nation-states; in totalitarian states this
perspective is carried to its logical extreme of insisting that human
rights belong, not to the individual, but to the state. The sociological and realist frames of reference, exhibiting a melange of conceptions of authority, offer little by way of emendation. The emerging
challenge to contemporary scholars is, thus, to create a theory for
inquiry about human rights, as for all problems, which merely postulates, rather than seeks to justify, the goal values of human dignity; which recognizes that there are human rights dimensions in
all social interaction and in all authoritative decision; and which
provides a comprehensive map of the context of global social interaction as well as intellectual procedures designed to aid in relating
particular decisions to fundamental policies.
3. Id. at 63-82.
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In his The InternationalLaw of Human Rights: A Reply to Recent Criticisms,4 Professor Louis B. Sohn offers a concise summary
of the anachronistic character of the conceptions, if ever they were
realistic, of global social process, and its processes of effective
power and authoritative decision, that are put forward by contemporary critics of the human rights developments. In modest understatement he points out that "the world of 1980 is quite different
from the world of 1939, 1856, or 1648. "5 He stresses the many limitations that states have over the years imposed upon their "sovereignty." His statement is brief but powerful, and it hits the jugular.
Professor Lowell F. Schechter, in The Views of "Charterists"
and "Skeptics" on Human Rights in the World Legal Order,6 presents a more comprehensive picture of the global social process,
including its processes of authoritative decision, and a more comprehensive conception of human rights. He refutes the contemporary critics point by point. In answer to the critics' emphasis upon
the disparities between prescription and application, he notes that
"it is relatively easy to find violations that have occurred," but that
"it is much more difficult" to produce evidence of the "violations
that have not occurred or have taken a milder form because of the
7
existence of international standards and enforcement machinery."
He might have added documentation of the tremendous increase in
the protection of human rights which has in fact been achieved
during the last 200 years.
In Some Thoughts on the Decline of International Law and
Future Prospects," Professor Richard Falk makes a very moving
statement of the intimate interdependences of human rights and
security, whether security be considered in the minimum sense of
mere survival or the optimum sense of the greater production and
wider sharing of all values. He finds that efforts to suppress "national revolutions" are comparable to efforts to contain the eruption of volcanoes, such as Mt. St. Helens. "It is," he writes, "the
world's dissidents, the resistance movements, and the human
rights actors, especially those independent of state power, that are
creating possibilities for change and the basis for hope." 9 This per4. 9 HoFsTRA L. REV. 347 (1981).
5. Id at 355.
6. 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 357 (1981).
7. Id. at 363.
8. 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 399 (1981).
9. Id. at 406.
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spective might carry more comfort if all "national revolutions" were
genuinely dedicated to human rights and self-determination, rather
than to the expansion of an external totalitarian imperialism. The
future. prospects envisaged by Professor Falk are grim and have aspects of realism, but it is possible that he overestimates the gap
between a "state system" and "other levels of organization," and
underestimates the potentialities of incremental change in transnational "codes" and other legal institutions.
In The Treaty Power and National Foreign Policy as Vehicles
for the Enforcement of Human Rights in the United States,10 Professor Covey T. Oliver presents, from the perspective of a strong
proponent, an interesting account of some of the early controversies concerning international human rights in this country. He describes and occasionally exhibits some of the very great difficulties
and complexities in the internal application and sanctioning of human rights within a mature, developed state. Fortunately, as he
demonstrates, the internal constitutive process of the United States
is undergoing considerable change. The reader of this piece may
be pardoned for recalling the dictum by the bard of Avon that a
rose by any other name smells just as sweet.
In his reflective Objections to Western Conceptions of Human
Rights," Professor Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., finds no "preexisting
social inheritance which can serve as a foundation for the substantive human rights norms which a supranational legal system would
implement," and seeks "to identify some of the major reasons for
the lack of a general agreement over the content of universal human rights.' 1 2 He appears to be searching for some "single moral
position" or "objective validity," and observes that there are intractable difficulties in interpreting and accommodating human
rights prescriptions, allegedly deriving from competitive Western
Liberalism and Marxian Socialism. One may applaud his emphasis
that a primary "intellectual task is to attain a deeper understanding
of the nature and purpose of human rights"' 3 without agreeing that
a "greater concentration" upon philosophical premises and derivation is the best modality for pursuing such understanding. For
many observers Professor Murphy may appear tremendously to undercut both humankind's great heritage in human dignity values

10. 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 411 (1981).
11. 9 HOFSTRA L. REV.433 (1981).
12. Id. at 433.
13. Id. at 444.
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and the degree of contemporary consensus about such values,
wholly independently of either Western Liberalism or Marxian Socialism.
Professor Ved. P. Nanda, in World Refugee Assistance: The
Role of International Law and Institutions,'4 deals with an.important and growing problem in human rights about which states most
obviously do share a common interest. Underscoring the critical
needs of the individual refugee, he summarizes the available legal
protection and denounces it as highly inadequate. He concludes by
recommending measures for enhanced protection, including an expansion of the technical concept of refugee, "universal acceptance"
of the international instruments relating to the protection of refugees, and strengthening the present structures of authority,
including especially the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It is an eloquent and timely plea.
In their joint article on Human Rights and the Emerging International Constitution,15 Professors Howard J. and Rita Falk
Taubenfeld make important contributions to the understanding of
the global constitutive process of authoritative decision. They find
"a largely unwritten international constitution" in the "complex of
rules for the creation and existence of international law,"'

6

and ex-

plore some of the features of this constitution, drawing parallels
with both federal and unitary national systems. Though perhaps
overemphasizing both the absence of writing and the role of rules
at the expense of observable institutional features, they note the
drastic contemporary shrinking of the concept of "domestic jurisdiction," and offer an interesting legislative history of the emergent
global bill of human rights. To develop and illustrate their themes,
they effectively employ a case study of human rights issues concerning "crimes against humanity," notably the crime of apartheid.
"The quest for international legal protection of human rights," they
observe, "has evolved into a process of attempting to make ever
more explicit-and hence more legally enforceable-an already
broadly delineated set of constitutional-type international guarantees to individuals and groups against which their own governments purportedly may not legally transgress."'17 In answer to critics who deplore the disparities between prescription and practice,
14.
15.
16.
17.

9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 449 (1981).
9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 475 (1981).
Id. at 475.
Id. at 497.
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they write: "[I]mperfect performance and de facto multiple
standards of achieved justice exist within all legal systems; this has
never been taken as an excuse for instituting anarchy or jungle
8
law."s
Professor (former Secretary) Dean Rusk, in A Personal Reflection on International Covenants on Human Rights,' 9 points to the
paradox that, while the United States is looked upon by many as
"the 'citadel' of human rights in the world," one "finds no heading
for 'human rights' or 'civil rights' " in examining "the rather detailed table of contents of the most recent Treaties in Force, published annually by the Department of State." 20 Hence, he poses
the question: "How does it happen that the United States, which
has played such a major role in promoting human rights on the
world scene, has been so reluctant to ratify central international
covenants in the same field?" 2' 1 With the insight of one who was
present during times of critical decisionmaking, he explores various
conditioning factors, including Senatorial opposition to the federal
government intruding itself at all into civil rights, reluctance to offer other nations any role in our own "travail," skepticism about
lip-service to human rights in other parts of the world, imagined
incompatibilities of the content of the human rights prescriptions
with our own constitution, and reservations about the federal government encroaching upon matters hitherto regarded as within
state competence. As wise statesman, he concludes that "the
United States should play a forthright role in promoting human
rights on the world scene, "22 and urges the Senate to give advice
and consent to the Genocide Convention and to the four major human rights treaties submitted by President Carter: The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights.
In their final report on The Establishment of an International
Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant InternationalInstruments,23 Professors M.
Cherif Bassiouni and Daniel H. Derby, coming seriously to grips
18. Id. at 511.
19.

9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 515 (1981).

20. Id. at 515.
21. Id. at 516.
22.
23.

Id. at 521.
9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 523 (1981).
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with the problem of implementation, propose a very specific modality in connection with the crime of apartheid. A "mandate to
implement the Apartheid Convention," they insist, "constitutes a
mandate to create more than the mechanisms necessary to set in
motion a new criminal process." 24 Hence, while underscoring all
the difficulties, they focus upon a specific proposal-the creation of
an international criminal court-and offer both a draft statute and a
comprehensive and useful set of commentaries.
It is to be hoped that the Editors of the Hofstra Law Review
have succeeded in stimulating still further debate about the fundamental policies which underlie all law in any community which
genuinely aspires toward the values of human dignity.
24.

Id. at 534.
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